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I.

Introduction

In any line of work there exists some unsavory task that most prefer to
avoid. Whether it is performing cold calls, cleaning bathrooms, reviewing
expense accounts, or sorting through that growing junk drawer, wisdom and
experience dictate that while that abhorrent task will never be pleasant,
someone must do it. Few tasks are more distasteful than that of legislators
cutting state budgets, and few areas are more difficult and controversial to
deal with than state aid to the most needy residents. The country’s current
631
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fiscal state and the aging population require that many states make difficult
decisions as they reduce spending on Medicaid.
Recently, both Illinois and New York found themselves between a
rock and a hard place as they were forced to choose where to save on
providing vital medical services for their aging and poor residents. Amplifying the difficulty of this task is the spotlight placed on legislators who
often face criticism regardless of their decisions.
Although nothing can make such budgetary decisions pleasant or provide results pleasing to all parties, a closer look indicates that the correct
process can yield results that maximize benefits and minimize harm to interested parties. While the state of the budget and generous Medicaid programs in Illinois make reform necessary, the SMART Act demonstrates the
adverse effects of a top-down, non-collaborative approach to legislation
when compared to the New York Model, which made similarly sweeping
cuts while collaborating with interested parties. After a brief background on
Medicaid, the SMART Act, New York’s reform model, and collaboration
theory, this Legislative Note will compare the approaches in Illinois and
New York and seek to explain why they yielded different results by applying collaboration theory to Medicaid reform.
II.

Medicaid in a Nutshell

In keeping with most controversial topics, Medicaid reform is thorny
and amorphous. Before jumping into an analysis of the cuts the reformers in
Illinois and New York made to their Medicaid programs, a simple explanation of Medicaid is expedient. Medicaid “is a cooperative state-federal, partially federally reimbursed program authorized under the Social Security
Act.”1 In Illinois, the state and federal governments share Medicaid costs,
each taking on 50%.2 Therefore, it is distinct from the 100% federally funded Medicare program.3 States may choose whether or not to participate, but
“participating States must comply with certain requirements imposed by the
Act and regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Health and Human
Services.”4 Medicaid is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 1396, commonly referred
to as the Federal Medicaid law.

1. Senn Park Nursing Ctr. v. Miller, 455 N.E.2d 153, 155-56 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983).
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396 (West 2012).
2. Medicaid 101, ILL. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTHCARE & FAM. SERVICES, 2,
http://www2.illinois.gov/hfs/agency/Documents/Medicaid101.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2013).
3. Id.
4. Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 502 (1990). See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396
(West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-148).
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Medicaid in Illinois exists to provide “healthcare for low-income Illinoisans.”5 In order to qualify for Medicaid, Illinois residents must fit into
one of four categories: children younger than nineteen, those disabled under
the Social Security definition, seniors aged sixty-five and older, or “other
adults” such as caretakers and pregnant women.6 In the years between 2007
and 2011, an additional six million people enrolled in Medicaid.7 This
number will only increase due to Medicaid expansion under the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act.8
III.

The Stormy Climate Surrounding Medicaid Reform and the Smart
Act

Illinois is not alone in its dreary fiscal climate.9 In its proposed “Medicaid Long-Term Care Reform Act of 2012,” Congress made numerous findings regarding the state of Medicaid and both federal and state finances.10
Across the board, Medicaid expenditures “exceed[] most components of
State budgets, including K-12 education programs.”11 Further, spending for
long-term care alone has grown 6.5% each year for the past seventeen
years,12 and the number of individuals likely to require long-term care will
likely grow over 250%.13 Providing a possible explanation for such numbers is the fact that the majority of people rely on Medicaid for long-term
care.14 As early as 2005, the National Governors Association called for
states to “encourage personal responsibility and discourage reliance on
Medicaid.”15
The controversy surrounding Illinois Senate Bill 2840, commonly referred to as the SMART (Save Medicaid Access and Resources Together)
Act,16 is no different than any politically charged debate. Rhetorical and
“worst case scenario” arguments are thrown back and forth with such force

2011).

5.
6.
7.

Medicaid 101, supra note 2, at 2.
Id.
Id. at 8 (noting that enrollment grew from 2.1 million in 2007 to 2.7 million in

8. Id. at 7.
9. Medicaid Long-Term Care Reform Act of 2012, H.R. 6300, 112th Cong.
(2012).
10. Id. § 2.
11. Id. § 3.
12. Id. § 2.
13. Id. § 6.
14. H.R. 6300.
15. Id. § 15.
16. Save Medicaid Access and Resources Together Act, Pub. Act 97-0689, 20122A ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. Adv. Legis. Serv. 209 (LexisNexis), available on Lexis Save
Medicaid Access and Resources Together Act, Pub. Act 97-0689, 2011 Ill. Adv. Legis. Serv.
689, at *1 (Lexis).
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that even the conscientious, informed observer is left with whiplash but
little with which to form an informed opinion. The inherent controversy
surrounding medical aid for the state’s most needy residents is complicated
by the proverbial challenge of a system reliant on cooperative federalism.
The unwieldy length of the Act itself does not help matters.
The SMART Act was signed by Illinois Governor Quinn in June of
2012 and took effect about one month later.17 Its wide-sweeping reforms,
which have not been fully realized, affect all Illinois residents because all
age and must deal with aging family members or dependents; the Act specifically concerns the elderly, those who work in the fields of elder law and
estate planning, and medically fragile and technology dependent (MFTD)
children and their families and communities.18 This Legislative Note focuses on the SMART Act’s cuts affecting Illinois’s aging population and Medicaid, the process utilized to enact those cuts, and the ensuing controversy.
According to the AARP Public Policy Institute, “the population age 85 and
older will triple from 2012 to 2050.”19 Specifically, between 2012 and
2032, the percent of Illinois’s total population that is age sixty-five and
older will increase from 12.8% to 18.7%,20 indicating the acute relevance of
any legislation affecting this population.
A true anomaly from its inception, the SMART Act represents work
across party lines and outside party stereotypes. Although it appears to be a
bill serving the fiscally conservative agenda, its sponsors are three Democrats and two Republicans.21 Further evidence of the SMART Act’s controversy is found in the eclectic make-up of its opposition, which also spans

17. Informational Notice, Ill. Dept. of Healthcare and Family Services, Coverage
Changes Resulting From the Save Medicaid Access and Resources Together (SMART) Act
(June 29, 2012), http://www.hfs.illinois.gov/html/062912n1.html.
18. See Save Medicaid Access and Resources Together Act, Pub. Act 97-0689,
2012-2A Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. Adv. Legis. Serv. 209 (LexisNexis), available on Lexis Save
Medicaid Access and Resources Together Act, Pub. Act 97-0689, 2011 Ill. Adv. Legis. Serv.
689, at *1 (Lexis). Parents of Medically Fragile and Technology Dependent (MRTD) children brought a class action suit for declaratory relief to keep funding for at-home care. See
Complaint, T.B. ex rel. Boyce. v. Hamos, No. 12-5356 (N. Dist. Ill. July 9, 2012), available
at http://savemftdwaiver.com/lawsuit/5-Complaint-.pdf. Further, State Representative Mary
Flowers introduced a bill to repeal any changes to the MRTD waiver made by the SMART
Act. Excellence in Academic Medicine Act of 2013, H.B. 6248, 97th Gen. Assemb., 2d
Sess. (Ill. 2012).
19. Ari Houser, Kathleen Ujvari & Wendy Fox-Grage, Across the States 2012:
Profiles of Long-Term Services and Supports 7 (9th ed. 2012).
20. Id. at 120.
21. Bill Status for SB 2840, 97th Illinois General Assembly,
www.ilga.gov/legislation/billstatus.asp?DocNum=2840&GAID=11&GA=97&DocTypeID=
SB&LegID=63280&SessionID=84&SpecSess=.
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party lines. Even some fiscal conservatives join liberals, social welfare proponents, and elder law attorneys, in condemning the dramatic cuts.22
Representative Patricia Bellock, House sponsor and long-time proponent of Medicaid reform in Illinois, explained that it was necessary and
overdue, and that “the other side of the aisle” got on board when Illinois
was threatened with a lower bond rating due to its dire financial situation. 23
Although both sides of the debate acknowledge the state’s fiscal crisis, opponents opine that the SMART Act will not stand up to legal challenges.
IV.

What Does the SMART Act Do?

The SMART Act promises to cut spending and help close the Medicaid funding gap of $2.7 billion24 by, among other ways, modifying eligibility requirements,25 verifying eligibility, reducing reimbursement rates for
Medicaid care providers, and cutting services from the generous program in
Illinois.26 According to a breakdown of the SMART Act’s cuts and subsequent savings by the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services, the cuts include vital services such as the termination of Illinois
Cares Rx, which covered the cost of prescription drugs and other services
deemed “optional” under Medicaid.27 The Act’s stated purpose is:
[i]n order to address the significant spending and liability
deficit in the medical assistance program budget of the Department of Healthcare and Family Services, the SMART
Act hereby implements changes, improvements, and efficiencies to enhance Medicaid program integrity to prevent
client and provider fraud; imposes controls on use of Medi22. See Chris Lauzen, Letter to the Editor, Why I Voted “No” on Medicaid Cuts,
GENEVA PATCH, June 25, 2012, http://geneva.patch.com/articles/lauzen-why-i-voted-no-tomedicaid-cuts; Letter from Zack Stamp, Nat’l Ass’n of Elder Law Attorneys (NAELA), to
Jeannette Badrov, Gen. Counsel, Ill. Dep’t of Healthcare and Family Servs. (Aug. 20, 2012)
(on file with author).
23. Telephone Interview with Patricia Bellock, Representative, Illinois 47th District
(Oct. 3, 2012).
24. Jim Covington, ISBA Statehouse Review for the week of May 24, 2012, ILLINOIS
LAWYER NOW (May 24, 2012), http://iln.isba.org/blog/2012/05/24/isba-statehouse-reviewweek-may-24.
25. Id.
26. FY13 Medical Assistance Budget Actions Associated with Senate Bill 2840—As
Passed by the General Assembly on May 24, 2012, ILL. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTHCARE &
FAM.
SERVICES,
http://www2.illinois.gov/hfs/sitecollectiondocuments/sb%202840%20medicaidspendingredu
ctionsrev.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2012) [hereinafter FY13 Medical Assistance Budget Actions].
27. Id.
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caid services to prevent over-use or waste; expands costsharing by clients; redesigns the Medicaid healthcare delivery system; and makes rate adjustments and reductions to
update rates or reflect budget realities.28
Specifically, the SMART Act purports to reduce the deficit in the
Healthcare and Family Services Budget by $1.6 billion in 2013.29 Of that
amount, “$1.36 Billion is assumed from reductions in optional services and
eligibility, eligibility verification, cost-sharing, care coordination and other
efforts. The remaining $240 Million in savings is attributable to medical
provider rate reductions.”30
The ambiguity, recency, and sheer length of the SMART Act make
deciphering it difficult, and it is almost impossible to discuss it briefly.31 In
order to combat such length and ambiguity, this Legislative Note limits its
focus to the changes to Medicaid eligibility requirements, the reductions in
rates paid to Medicaid providers, and cuts in medical services affecting the
elderly, as these topics received significant attention from the legal community and the media.32
Besides its specific spending cuts, which are discussed in detail below,
the following are notable changes the SMART Act calls for. While emergency rules were previously only operative for 150 days, the SMART Act
amended the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act so that its implementary
emergency rules are effective for one year,33 allowing the Department of
28. Save Medicaid Access and Resources Together Act, Pub. Act 97-0689, 2011 Ill.
Adv. Legis. Serv. 689, at *1 (Lexis).
29. Balanced Budget Note, House Floor Amendment No. 5, 97th Gen. Assembly
(Office
of
Management
and
Budget),
http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocNum=2840&GAID=11&DocTypeID=SB
&LegId=63280&SessionID=84&GA=97 (last visited Jan. 4, 2013).
30. Fiscal Note, House Floor Amendment No. 4, 97th Gen. Assembly (Dept. of
Healthcare
&
Family
Services),
http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocNum=2840&GAID=11&DocTypeID=SB
&LegId=63280&SessionID=84&GA=97 (last visited Jan. 4, 2013).
31. Constance B. Renzi, And It’s Another Curve Ball—The SMART Act Brings
More Change to the Medicaid Eligibility Rules, ELDER L. (Illinois State Bar Association/Section on Elder Law, Springfield, IL) Sept. 2012 (“Before the dust even had a chance
to settle from the post-DRA (Deficit Reduction Act of 2005) rule changes, which took effect
on January 1, 2012, the citizens of Illinois were thrown yet another curveball . . . another
round of significant and harsh changes to the Medicaid eligibility rules.”).
32. See id.; Letter from Zack Stamp to Jeannette Badrov, supra note 22.
33. See Save Medicaid Access and Resources Together Act, Pub. Act 97-0689,
2011 Ill. Adv. Legis. Serv. 689, at *10 (Lexis); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/5-45 (Lexis current
through P.A. 97-1136 of the 2012 Leg. Sess.). “Emergency rulemaking” allows an agency to
adopt rules “without prior notice or hearing upon filing a notice of emergency rulemaking
with the Secretary of State” if the situation “reasonably constitutes a threat to the public
interest, safety, or welfare.” Id.
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Healthcare and Family Services to “circumvent the rulemaking process.”34
A provision already sparking discussion is the four-year moratorium, which
prohibits any Medicaid expansion other than those required by the federal
government.35 Illinois also took steps36 by improving oversight of enrollees
and vendors through enhanced screening and data sharing agreements with
other agencies to verify eligibility and payment.37 The state hired a private
vendor to implement verification and address the problem of over 300,000
people who erroneously receive Medicaid benefits.38
V.

The New York Model

According to the Medical Society of New York, “Medicaid, as historically administered, fails the taxpayer, the providers, and most importantly,
its intended beneficiaries—the state’s most needy citizens.”39 It is with this
in mind that New York Governor Andrew M. Cuomo attacked New York’s
34. Letter from Zack Stamp to Jeannette Badrov, supra note 22.
35. Doug Finke & Chris Wetterich, Medicaid Moratorium Could Hamper Illinois
Action on Federal Health Law, STATE J.-REG., Sept. 9, 2012, http://www.sj-r.com/topstories/x1547505575/Medicaid-moratorium-could-hamper-Illinois-action-on-federal-healthlaw. When considered with the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, this provision
presents questions and complications beyond the scope of this Legislative Note. The Supreme Court recently made Medicaid expansion optional, allowing states to choose not to
expand Medicaid. NFIB v. Sebelius, No. 11-393, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 4876 (June 28, 2012);
see also Robert Pear & Michael Cooper, Reluctance in Some States over Medicaid Expansion, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/30/us/politics/somestates-reluctant-over-medicaid-expansion.html (allowing the states to choose not to expand
Medicaid). However, “the Affordable Care Act require[s] states to expand Medicaid as a
condition of keeping federal reimbursements.” Finke & Wetterich, supra. In order to make
the expansions it has been promising and in order to keep current federal funding, the Quinn
administration will have to obtain approval from the General Assembly. Id. However, that
may not be an easy task. Due to the bipartisan effort supporting passage of the SMART Act
and the state’s financial crisis, Representative Bellock stated that “there will be a lot of discussion on both sides of the aisle.” Id. Representative Frank Mautino predicts that if the
General Assembly decides not to lift the moratorium and expand Medicaid, single, childless
adults will be left without coverage and end up seeking necessary care in emergency rooms.
Id. (noting that single, childless adults “could neither obtain Medicaid coverage nor be eligible to buy insurance through the planned insurance exchanges.”). Jim Duffett, executive
director of Campaign for Better Health Care, anticipates the General Assembly will pass a
“clarification” instead of a full suspension of the moratorium and will allow only expansions
covered by PPACA. Finke & Wetterich, supra.
36. Transcript of Debates, SB 2840, Illinois Senate, 97th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess.,
March 28, 2012, at 95, http://www.ilga.gov/senate/transcripts/strans97/09700098.pdf.
37. Id. at 95.
38. Audio recording: House Floor Debate SB 2840, 97th Gen. Assembly, May 24,
2012 (on file with author).
39. Med. Soc’y of the State of N.Y., Approaches to Medicaid Reform, MD News,
Mar. 19, 2011, http://www.mdnews.com/news/2011_03/05848_mar2011_approaches-tomedicaid-reform.
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flawed system—and he was faced with a system with unparalleled flaws. At
the time of the creation of the Medicaid Redesign Team, New York spent
“more than twice the national average on Medicaid on a per capita basis”
and was ranked second for highest spending per Medicaid enrollee, twentyfirst for “overall health system quality,” and fiftieth for avoidable hospital
use and costs.40
Faced with a similar, and arguably worse, financial situation than Illinois, New York enacted similarly sweeping reforms to its Medicaid longterm care program with a novel system.41 In January of 2011, Governor
Cuomo assembled his Medicaid Redesign Team (MRT) for the purpose of
“provid[ing] guidance for, and advice to, the Governor.”42 In order to promote cooperation and teamwork between the industry and the state government, he “invited key Medicaid stakeholders to the table in a spirit of
collaboration to see what could be achieved collectively to change course
and rein in Medicaid spending, while at the same time improving quality.”43
The resulting plan boasts the ability to cut “more than $1.1 billion . . . while
improving service to the one in four New Yorkers it serves.”44 Although the
plan is still being implemented, such claims, along with Governor Cuomo’s
unique approach, warrant attention from states stuck between the same rock
and hard place.
New York’s three-year, holistic plan focuses on “efficiency, economy,
and quality of care,”45 rather than merely eliminating spending.46 Its 4.7
million government healthcare recipients will transition to managed care,
“ending the use of hospital emergency rooms that drive up costs and pro40. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 8.5 (West, Westlaw through Dec. 26,
2012).
41. See id.
42. Id.
43. Medicaid Redesign Team, A Plan to Transform the Empire State’s Medicaid
Program. Multi-Year Action Plan, N.Y. STATE DEPT. OF HEALTH 4,
http://www.health.ny.gov/health_care/medicaid/redesign/docs/mrtfinalreport.pdf (last visited
Feb. 1, 2013) [hereinafter N.Y. Plan].
44. Cuomo’s Medicaid Reform Task Force Hits Target, CBS N.Y., Feb. 25, 2011,
http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2011/02/25/cuomos-medicaid-reform-task-force-hits-target.
45. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-148) (federal
Medicaid law requiring that state Medicaid policies assure these things).
46. See Med. Soc’y of the State of N.Y., supra note 39. “Managed care” is defined
as “a delivery system for Medicaid benefits” in which “people get most or all of their Medicaid services from an organization under contract with the state.” Managed Care,
http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/DeliverySystems/Managed-Care/Managed-Care.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2013). They have an “ultimate goal of fully-integrated care management for virtually the entire Medicaid population,” where “a single care management organization would be responsible for managing the
complete needs of a member (acute, long term and behavioral care).” Med. Soc’y of the
State of N.Y., supra note 39.
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vide limited service to patients.”47 In completing the first phase of its assignment, Cuomo’s MRT made recommendations to the legislature that will
“lower[] immediate spending” by saving the state $2.2 billion in 2011 and
2012 alone and “will lead to improved health outcomes, as well as further
savings in years to come.”48 Although budgetary problems were a motivating factor, New York set out to meet three goals, only one of which was
directly related to cutting spending.49 The State aims to improve care, improve health, and reduce costs through a total system overhaul addressing
the type of care provided, the way care is managed, the way records are
kept, and the way providers are reimbursed.50 The seventy-eight phase one
initiatives now being implemented also include “traditional cost containment ideas” such as rate reductions and utilization controls utilized in Illinois.51
The “most important” and perhaps most innovative recommendation is
a cap on Medicaid spending across the state.52 The cap forces New York to
track spending and determine, on a monthly basis, what factors are causing
it to meet or miss its target spending.53 Further, in order to stay within the
limit enforced by the Commissioner of Health, state officials and stakeholders must take into account how each expenditure affects cost and quality of medical care.54 This will also enable individual facilities to make
changes to cut costs and increase efficiency, instead of implementing
across-the-board cuts.55
The New York plan is not without its critics. While the plan purports
to reform the Medicaid system, there are those who are wary of another
plan that “seek[s] to grab every federal Medicaid dollar it can get.”56
VI.

An Introduction to Collaboration as a Means of Governance

Although the concepts are neither new nor complicated, the processes
referred to as collaborative governance, new governance, and civic republicanism represent “an emerging alternative to traditional command-and47. Med. Soc’y of the State of N.Y., supra note 39.
48. Id.
49. See id.
50. Id.
51. N.Y. Plan, supra note 43, at 7.
52. See id.
53. Id. at 30.
54. Id. at 29.
55. Cuomo’s Medicaid Reform Task Force Hits Target, supra note 44.
56. Russell Sykes, The Perils of Cuomo’s Medicaid Reform, N.Y. POST (Apr. 3,
2012),
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/the_perils_of_cuomo_medicaid_ref
orm_Z2dIl5tWm0wflGfe1Bf7LI.
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control approaches to making, implementing, and enforcing policy.”57 The
wisdom of New York’s collaboration is supported by countless legal and
political theorists58 and was even encouraged by President Obama’s 2010
memorandum on collaborative governance, where he “direct[ed] federal
agencies to work on policy together with the public and stakeholders from
the public, private, and nonprofit sectors.”59 The theory of collaborative
governance acknowledges, and subsequently rejects, long-held assumption
that knowledge and valuable input are concentrated at the proverbial top of
the legislative and administrative processes. Instead, it assumes that
knowledge is spread throughout society and that “a strong democracy needs
many voices and values.”60 Thus, according to this school of thought, collaboration with “the general public, state, regional, and local government
agencies, tribes, nonprofit organizations, businesses, and other nongovernmental stakeholders”61 is not merely good public relations; it is necessary to
an efficient process yielding good policy.
Senator Mike Crapo, of Idaho, argues that “the prevailing model of
centralized policymaking and dispute resolution through litigation diminishes our capacity to create effective solutions to problems.”62 Beyond lacking efficiency, the top-down approach “excludes local citizens from the real
decision-making process.”63 As will be demonstrated by a closer look at the
Illinois and New York reform efforts, this exclusion creates barriers and
further distance between legislators and the general public. Such barriers
result in disincentives to public involvement in policy development, misunderstanding of policy, and discontent with resulting legislation.64
In contrast, the simple knowledge that they may impact a decision
“gives interested groups an incentive to communicate their point of view to
the public-at-large, and gives members of the public an incentive to listen
and to seek out forums where public discussion will ensue.”65 Further, once
involved in public deliberation, citizens often are motivated and empowered
to invest themselves in solving the problem at hand and are more likely to

57. Lisa Blomgren Bingham, The Next Generation of Administrative Law: Building
the Legal Infrastructure for Collaborative Governance, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 297, 300 (2010).
58. See id.; Robert B. Reich, Public Administration and Public Deliberation: An
Interpretive Essay, 94 YALE L.J. 1617, 1640 (1985); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican
Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1514 (1992).
59. Bingham, supra note 57, at 298.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 299.
62. Senator Mike Crapo, Collaboration As A Means to Formulating Mutually Beneficial Environmental Policy, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 351 (2004).
63. Id.
64. See id.
65. Reich, supra note 58, at 1635.
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reconsider their opinions.66 Collaboration and open communication in the
legislative process create an atmosphere ripe for positive compromise and
creativity instead of litigation.
Public involvement in creation of policy and legislation is of dire importance because those closest to the problem often possess the perspective
to solve it creatively and practically. Group discussion is likely to lead to
better outcomes, if only because competing views are stated and exchanged.67 Cass Sunstein pointed to Aristotle as supporting collaboration in
governance when he asserted that when “all come together . . . they may
surpass—collectively and as a body, although not individually—the quality
of the few best.”68 Mr. Sunstein argued that legislators should enter the process of deliberation without “preselected interests that operate as exogenous
variables.”69 This allows all proffered solutions and desires to be subjected
to multiple parties.
Collaboration theory is most often applied to, demonstrated in, and associated with the federal government on a broad, national level.70 This Legislative Note seeks to apply the principles of collaborative governance at
the state level, as even political actors as close as state law makers would
benefit from a reminder to actively engage the public instead of making
unilateral decisions from the capitol.
VII.
A.

Comparing the New York and Illinois Attempts at Medicaid Reform
SAME PROBLEM, SAME GOAL

Illinois and New York were faced with similarly bleak fiscal situations
necessitating change. Although vastly different states with vastly different
constituencies, both states found themselves between the same proverbial
“rock” and “hard place” as they were forced to balance their bloated budgets, address the inherently flawed Medicaid system, and do this by cutting
spending for healthcare of the poor and elderly. Medicaid reform is neither
an easy nor a popular task, but both states were forced to take it on.
After the extravagant rein of Governor Blagojevich, during which
some argue Illinois already had almost universal healthcare, the Illinois
legislature had to make changes.71 Representative Patricia Bellock, House
co-sponsor of the Illinois SMART Act, called the state’s Medicaid program
66. Id.
67. See Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110
YALE L.J. 71, 73 (Oct. 2000).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Bingham, supra note 57, at 298.
71. Telephone Interview with Patricia Bellock, supra note 23.
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a “ticking time bomb.”72 When questioned about the impact of the SMART
Act’s sweeping cuts, House Sponsor and Representative Sara Feigenholtz
stated, “if we do nothing, all of Illinois and every eligible person will lose.
The whole system will collapse.”73
Illinois is already bankrupt for all practical purposes and holds the second lowest bond rating in the country.74 Unable to sustain its exhaustive
program, Illinois was threatened with a lower bond rating and with the prospect that by 2017 its Medicaid bills would reach twenty-one billion dollars.75 In his budget address, Governor Quinn called for “a rendezvous with
reality,” and the legislature responded.76 That changes had to be made was
all too clear to individuals on both sides of the aisle.77
Proponents of the SMART Act’s changes argue that the current system
was not effective or sustainable.78 Although it consumed almost half of the
Illinois state budget, the State was unable to pay Medicaid service providers, who were beginning to go out of business due to the six-month wait for
payment.79 It is estimated that it supported about 300,000 individuals who
did not qualify, including residents of Wisconsin and Indiana and individuals with over one million dollars in assets. This number was due in part to
the lenient system for confirming qualification (requiring only one
paycheck stub) and the fact that recipients had to affirmatively act to stop
aid.80 The program’s unsustainability is more apparent when compared with
the rest of the country.81 Data presented to the legislature last spring indicated that Illinois offered more optional Medicaid programs than almost
any other state.82 Further, Illinois maintained Illinois Care Rx (its program
72. Id.
73. Audio recording: House Floor Debate SB 2840, 97th Gen. Assembly, May 24,
2012 (on file with author).
74. See Telephone Interview with Patricia Bellock, supra note 23; Interview with
Mike Fortner, Representative, Illinois 95th Dist., in DeKalb, Ill. (Sept. 28, 2012) (noting that
Illinois faced five to seven billion dollars in unpaid bills with an annual budget of only sixty
million dollars).
75. Telephone Interview with Patricia Bellock, supra note 23.
76. Audio recording: House Floor Debate SB 2840, 97th Gen. Assembly, May 24,
2012 (on file with author).
77. See Telephone Interview with Patricia Bellock, supra note 23; audio recording:
House Floor Debate SB 2840, 97th Gen. Assembly, May 24, 2012 (on file with author);
Senate Floor Debate Transcript, SB 2840, third reading, May 24, 2012, at 94; audio recording: House Executive Committee SB 2840, 97th Gen. Assembly, May 22, 2012 (on file with
author).
78. See Telephone Interview with Patricia Bellock, supra note 23; Interview with
Mike Fortner, Representative, supra note 74; Telephone Interview with Lou Lang, Representative, Illinois 16th Dist. Deputy Majority Leader, (Oct. 10, 2012).
79. Telephone Interview with Patricia Bellock, supra note 23.
80. Id.
81. Interview with Mike Fortner, supra note 74.
82. Id.
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providing prescription medications).83 Most other states ended similar programs, deeming them unnecessary, when Medicare Part D became effective.84
New York found itself in a similarly bleak, if not worse, situation before developing its own Medicaid reform. This was most directly linked to
what Governor Cuomo described as “a disjointed, sprawling administrative
structure.”85 The State was faced with the daunting task of not only cutting
Medicaid expenditures but also improving the efficiency and quality of the
care it provided to Medicaid recipients.86
New York physicians’ negative impression of the Medicaid system is
understandable given the state’s rank at sixth from the bottom in Medicaidto-Medicare fee ratios nationally, which serves as further evidence of the
state’s flawed system.87 As stated above, New York spent more than double
the national average on Medicaid per capita, had the second highest spending per enrollee, the most avoidable hospital use, and was ranked twentyfirst for “overall health system quality.”88 New York Medicaid enrollees
increased 73% percent between 2000 and 2010, culminating in one-third of
New York residents being covered by Medicaid in 2011 and a cost of fiftythree billion dollars in 2012.89
Russell Sykes, senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute’s Empire Center for New York State Policy, noted that New York offered more services
with more lenient eligibility requirements than most other states and that
the problem was only compounded by the fact that “compassion has
trumped even the most basic anti-fraud measures . . . .”90 For example, New
York did not require face-to-face eligibility interviews and had only relaxed
screening for both recipients and service providers.91
B.

CUTS: SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

Illinois chose to reform its Medicaid program in one large, easily identifiable act, and New York’s reform was enacted less conventionally in a

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Executive Order No. 5: Establishing the Medicaid Redesign Team, 9 N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. § 8.5 (West, Westlaw through Dec. 26, 2012).
86. Id.
87. Med. Soc’y of the State of N.Y., supra note 39.
88. Executive Order No. 5: Establishing the Medicaid Redesign Team, 9 N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS, § 8.5 (West, Westlaw through Dec. 26, 2012).
89. Sykes, supra note 56.
90. Id.
91. Med. Soc’y of the State of N.Y., supra note 39.
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piecemeal fashion.92 However, on a practical level, their changes covered
similar areas, and the differences are attributable to New York’s use of collaboration.93 Where the two states do not differ, New York benefits from its
use of collaboration. Through collaboration, individuals feel engaged and
heard, come to understand the reasons for changes, and are more likely to
accept them.94 It necessarily follows that where constituents accept decisions, they are likely less apt to bring costly lawsuits. This, along with the
superior policy yielded by collaboration, supports the wisdom of using collaboration.
1.

Rate Reductions

New York reduced the rate by which Medicaid reimburses all Medicaid providers with a 2% across-the-board cut, which affects payments for
services rendered between April 2011 and March 31, 2013.95 Considering
the MRT’s recommendations were only proposed in February of 2011, this
was a fast and sweeping cut. Illinois also reduced its reimbursement rates
for hospitals, ambulances, and long-term care providers.96 Illinois’s approach differed in that it was specific, rather than across-the-board.97 The
SMART Act reduced the reimbursement rate for general medical providers
by 2.7%.98 Facilities not subject to this rate reduction include “[s]ervices
rendered through physicians, dentists, community health centers . . . safetynet hospitals, critical access hospitals, the Medicaid Rehabilitation Option,
a state university or unit of local government . . . and long-term care facili-

92. Compare Save Medicaid Access and Resources Together Act, Pub. Act 970689, 2011 Ill. Adv. Legis. Serv. 689, at *1 (Lexis), with N.Y. Plan, supra note 43.
93. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. TIT. 9, § 8.5 (West, Westlaw through
Dec. 26, 2012); Sunstein, supra note 67. Research did not yield substantial negative press or
anyone speaking out about the New York reforms, but there was significant opposition
voiced regarding the Illinois reforms. See, e.g., Joseph Sjostrom, Loss of Drug Program
Spells Hardships, Will End of Illinois Cares Rx Save Money or Cost the State More?, AARP
BULLETIN
(Sept.
1,
2012),
http://www.aarp.org/health/health-insurance/info-092012/prescription-drug-assistance-program-cut-il.html.
94. See Reich, supra note 58, at 1635.
95. E.g., MRT Proposals Project Management Plan, N.Y. STATE DEPT. OF HEALTH,
www.health.ny.gov/health_care/medicaid/redesign/docs/2011-0712_medicaid_redesign_plan_workbook.xls (last visited Jan. 5, 2013) (noting that the payment reduction was pursuant to proposal 4651-B); 2% Across the Board Medicaid Payment
Reductions, N.Y. STATE DEPT. OF HEALTH, http://www.health.ny.gov/health_care/state/index
(last visited Jan. 5, 2013) (noting that the payment reduction was enacted in the 2011-12
state budget in Chapter 59 of the Laws of 2011).
96. 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5e, 5/14-11 (State Bar Edition 2012).
97. See FY13 Medical Assistance Budget Actions, supra note 26, at 11.
98. Id.
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ties . . . .”99 The reimbursement rate for hospitals, which are not safety-net
or critical access facilities and are not operated by a state university or local
government, is reduced by 3.5%.100 Rates of reimbursement for nursing
home services are reduced differently depending upon the service.101 In
total, the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services estimates
that these rate reductions will save Illinois $240,000 each year.102 In addition to calling for these general rate reductions, Illinois reformers gave the
Department of Healthcare and Family Services the power to enact the specific reductions.103
In this area, although Illinois made greater cuts, legislators took a more
moderate, careful approach than did New York. Despite this fact, Illinois
providers responded poorly to the cuts.104 Illinois legislators considered the
nature of the facility in choosing the percentage by which its reimbursement
would be reduced, while New York cut reimbursement to all Medicaid providers at the same rate without considering the individual nature of the various providers. Illinois advocate groups responded by arguing that the rate
reductions block accessibility of healthcare and violate federal Medicaid
law.105 Despite their drastic nature, the New York rate reductions106 were
99.
100.

Id.
Id. The SMART Act defines a “safety-net hospital” as one that:
(1) is licensed by the Department of Public Health as a general acute
care or pediatric hospital; and
(2) is a disproportionate share hospital, as described in Section 1923 of
the federal Social Security Act, as determined by the Department; and
(3) meets one of the following:(A) has a MIUR of at least 40% and
a charity percent of at least 4%; or (B) has a MIUR of at least 50%.
305 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5e.1 (State Bar Edition 2012). “‘Charity percent’ means the ratio
of (i) the hospital’s charity charges for services provided to individuals without health insurance or another source of third party coverage to (ii) the Illinois total hospital charges, each
as
reported
on
the
hospital’s
OBRA
form.”
Id.
“MUIR” means Medicaid Inpatient Utilization Rate and is defined as
a fraction, the numerator of which is the number of a hospital’s inpatient
days provided in the hospital’s fiscal year ending 3 years prior to the rate
year, to patients who, for such days, were eligible for Medicaid under
Title XIX of the federal Social Security Act, 42 USC 1396a et seq., and
the denominator of which is the total number of the hospital’s inpatient
days in that same period.
Id. (emphasis in original).
101. Id.
102. FY13 Medical Assistance Budget Actions, supra note 26, at 11.
103. Id.
104. E.g., Letter from Zack Stamp to Jeannette Badrov, supra note 22.
105. Letter from Zack Stamp to Jeannette Badrov, supra note 22.
106. See, e.g., MRT Proposals Project Management Plan, supra note 95 (noting that
the payment reduction was pursuant to proposal 4651-B); 2% Across the Board Medicaid
Payment Reductions, supra note 95 (noting that the payment reduction was enacted in the
2011-12 state budget in Chapter 59 of the Laws of 2011).
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received well after they were discussed with interested parties, and in some
cases, hospital representatives even agreed to the rate reductions after hearing the rationale behind them.107 This disparate effect indicates that collaboration and communication yields greater acceptance, even for drastic cuts.
Even though the New York reductions took more from the providers, because they were involved in the process and were engaged in a discussion,
they conceivably gained understanding of the reasons for the decision and
were not shocked or upset by it.
2.

Eligibility Requirements
i.

Eligibility Requirements in Illinois

Illinois took the conventional approach to cutting costs, which calls for
wading through the services supported by Medicaid and cutting or reducing
optional ones wherever possible. This required legislators to make incredibly difficult decisions in order to “find that happy medium” between the
need to provide quality care to its residents with the need to balance the
budget and avoid further bankrupting the state.108 Representative
Feigenholtz stated that the sponsors attempted to “craft a Bill that protected
the neediest people here in the State of Illinois but also cut back on excesses
in the program.”109 However, when such “excesses” are comprised of services to the poor and elderly, it is almost impossible to find the line between necessary and excess.110 The house floor debates and House Executive Committee hearings reveal the turmoil and emotion that went into passing the reforms.111 Despite the intent of the sponsors to “serve the . . . most .
. . vulnerable population,” they experienced severe backlash from fellow
representatives and members of the public.112 The SMART Act made several changes increasing eligibility requirements, six of which are most
107. Governor Accepts Recommendations From the Medicaid Redesign Team, Governor
Andrew
M.
Cuomo,
http://www.governor.ny.gov/press/022411cuomoaccepts_medicaidredesignteam (last visited
Oct. 10, 2012).
108. Audio recording: House Floor Debate SB 2840, 97th Gen. Assembly, May 24,
2012 (on file with author) (comment by House Republican Leader Tom Cross).
109. Id. (comments by Representative Sarah Feigenholtz).
110. See, Audio recording: House Floor Debate SB 2840, 97th Gen. Assembly, May
24, 2012 (on file with author); Audio recording: House Exec. Comm. SB 2840, 97th Gen.
Assembly, May 22, 2012 (on file with author).
111. See generally, Audio recording: House Floor Debate SB 2840, 97th Gen. Assembly, May 24, 2012 (on file with author); Audio recording: House Exec. Comm. SB 2840,
97th Gen. Assembly, May 22, 2012 (on file with author).
112. Audio recording: House Floor Debate SB 2840, 97th Gen. Assembly, May 24,
2012 (on file with author) (comments by Representative Patricia Bellock).
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noteworthy. The Act reduced eligibility to incomes of 133% of the federal
poverty level for adults in the family care program, eliminated the ability of
residents over the age of sixty-five who are not wards of a public guardian
to participate in Federal Pooled Trusts, eliminated the exemption of farmland and homestead property held in trusts, increased the determination of
need (DON) score required for Medicaid eligibility from twenty-nine to
thirty-seven, and reduced the amount of resources a spouse of a Medicaid
recipient may hold.113 Proponents of the Act argue that these restrictions on
eligibility were necessary to cut Medicaid expenditures in order to continue
serving those who really need it.114 A break down of the eligibility restrictions causing the most debate is necessary to highlight the arguments
for and against each one and any problems implicated.
(1) Pooled Trusts
Before the SMART Act passed, Illinois residents over the age of sixtyfive were able to transfer funds into pooled trusts and still qualify for Medicaid.115 Under the new rule, those older than sixty-five who are wards of a
public guardian may continue to place assets in pooled trusts and still qualify for Medicaid assistance, but those with private guardians may not.116
Although, at first blush, this change would seem to reduce Medicaid
subscribers and save the state money, there is evidence that it will result in
greater cost.117 A study conducted by the University of Illinois in 2009 concluded that the state saves “significant funds” as a result of allowing the use
of pooled trusts.118 This is due, in part, to the fact that use of such trusts
keeps residents over the age of sixty-five in their homes longer.119 “Without
the trusts, many of the trust beneficiaries would enter nursing homes far
sooner than necessary,” resulting in greater cost to the state and diminished
quality of life to residents.120 Further, there are approximately thirty-eight
counties in Illinois with no appointed public guardian, leaving even those
the rule aims to protect without the benefit of pooled trusts.121 Beyond the
practical issues this hastily implemented rule presents, the National Association of Elder Law Attorneys (NAELA) notes that the distinction between
113. 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-1.2, 5/5-4(a), 5/5-2(15), 5/5-5 (Lexis current through
P.A. 97-1136 of the 2012 Leg. Sess.).
114. See id.
115. Renzi, supra note 31, at 2.
116. 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-1.2 (State Bar Edition 2012).
117. See Letter from Zack Stamp to Jeannette Badrov, supra note 22.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Wendy Capelletto, Letter to the Editor, Bill Would be Harsh on Seniors, Chi.
Sun-Times, May 24, 2012 at 25.
121. Letter from Zack Stamp to Jeannette Badrov, supra note 22.
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wards of the public guardian and those with private guardians “creates a
certainty of litigation by” distinguishing between similarly situated individuals, seemingly without justification.122
(2)

Homestead Property

The SMART Act states that homes held in a trust are no longer exempt
as “homestead property” for purposes of determining Medicaid eligibility.123 The Act defines “homestead” as the dwelling house and contiguous
real estate owned and occupied by the person, regardless of its value.124
Homes which would previously have been considered unavailable for purposes of determining total assets for Medicaid eligibility are now considered available assets if no spouse or minor, blind, or disabled child lives in
the home, and the home is valued at more than $525,000.125 Further, any
home transferred to a trust is not considered exempt as “homestead property.”126
Although this does not seem facially detrimental or unreasonable, as
those with homes valued at more than $525,000 should conceivably be able
to pay the costs of healthcare, problems lurk in the un-stated ramifications.
There are no time limits on the elimination of the homestead exemption for
property in trusts; therefore, individuals with decades-old trusts are penalized just as are those with new trusts.127 Further, this is a significant drop
from the recently enacted rule pursuant to the Deficit Reduction Act
(DRA), which allowed exemptions for property valued at up to $750,000 in
January of 2012.128 The elder law community opposes this, as is understandable given that they were intimately involved with the process of shaping the post-Deficit Reduction Act rules only months before the rules were
changed substantially.129 NAELA suggests that this change will ultimately
harm the state, as single residents will have to sell their homes to pay for
122. Id.
123. 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-1.2 (Lexis current through P.A. 97-1136 of the 2012
Leg. Sess.).
124. Id.
125. Renzi, supra note 31, at 4.
126. 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-1.2 (Lexis current through P.A. 97-1136 of the 2012
Leg. Sess.).
127. Letter from Zack Stamp to Jeannette Badrov, supra note 22.
128. Anthony B. Ferraro, Did We Just Get SACT? The SMART Act of 2012—The
Unfolding Implications and Anecdotes, ELDER L. (Illinois State Bar Association/Section on
Elder Law, Springfield, Ill.) Dec. 2012 at 4.
129. See Illinois Elder Law Attorneys Negotiate Better DRA Rules, Elder Law Answers,
http://www2.elderlawanswers.com/resources/ArticleAtty.asp?id=9470&section=3&state=
(last visited Jan. 6, 2013).
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nursing home care and will eventually qualify for Medicaid, costing the
state much more than supporting that person in his or her own home from
the beginning.130 These arguments represent subtleties that seem to have
been overlooked in the rush to pass mass reforms in Illinois.
(3)

Increased DON Score

Eligibility for institutional and home and community-based care is determined partially by an individual’s DON score, with a higher number
indicating more of a need.131 Under the SMART Act, the minimum requirement jumped from twenty-nine to thirty-seven.132
According to Elmhurst-based attorney and CPA Ben A. Neiburger, Illinois residents in assisted living facilities will find themselves without the
help of Medicaid when their own funds are exhausted.133 Cheryl Jansen,
Legislative Director at Equip for Equality, argued that people who currently
rely on assistance to eat, dress, and bathe will find themselves without “any
form of long-term care services from the state.”134 Jansen opined that, “ultimately, this will be counter-productive.”135 It will leave individuals who
would have maintained independence with some assistance without any,
resulting in deteriorating health on an individual level and higher costs on a
state level when these individuals enter nursing homes and hospitals.136
Further, it “will thwart the state’s efforts toward rebalancing the long-term
care system towards increased community-based care” by making it more
difficult for residents to qualify for such care, leaving them to rely on more
expensive and restrictive care when it becomes necessary.137
ii. Eligibility Requirements in New York
New York chose not to focus on cutting services rendered and narrowing the pool of residents eligible for those services.138 Instead, New York
focused on spending money and providing services more efficiently in or-

130. Letter from Zack Stamp to Jeannette Badrov, supra note 22.
131. 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5 (Lexis current through P.A. 97-1136 of the 2012
Leg. Sess.).
132. Id.
133. Adam W. Lasker, New Medicaid Law will limit Estate-Planning, Other Options,
100 ILL. B. J. 458, 459 (2012).
134. Audio recording: House Exec. Comm. SB 2840, 97th Gen. Assembly, May 22,
2012 (on file with author).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See MRT Proposals Project Management Plan, supra note 95.
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der to cut costs while expanding subscribers and services offered.139 It
seems that, in implementing his MRT and adopting an innovative take on
Medicaid reform, Governor Cuomo heeded the words of J.W. Fossett in his
2009 article.140 After assessing the flaws in New York’s system along with
those around the country, Fossett concluded:
Implementation of the most commonly discussed health reform models is unlikely to produce major improvement in
either state or federal finances as a result of declines in the
growth of Medicaid spending. A different version of health
reform, targeted explicitly to long-term care, state cost and
revenue shifting, and other more focused concerns, would
be necessary to achieve these ends.141
It must be acknowledged that Illinois and New York operate from two
different ways of thinking. Governor Cuomo acted in reliance on the implementation of the Affordable Care Act and sought as much in federal
funding as possible,142 while Illinois leaders sought to simply cut the
amount they spend.143 However, the eligibility requirements and cuts in
service that were recommended by the MRT and adopted by the New York
State Legislature did not cause controversy or debate. Perhaps this is due to
the inherently different process undertaken in New York, which included
constant consultation and communication with the very people affected by
the changes.144
3.

Pharmaceutical Programs

The Illinois legislature eliminated Illinois Cares Rx, the state’s holistic
prescription program paying for Medicaid enrollees’ prescriptions in its
entirety.145 In exchange for the liberal program enacted by Governor Blago139. See id.
140. See J.W. Fossett, Medicaid and Health Reform: The Case of New York, 12
HEALTH AFFAIRS 81, 92 (1993), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/12/3/81.
141. Id.
142. Sykes, supra note 56 (noting that Governor Cuomo’s reform strategy “doesn’t
reform the Empire State’s longstanding practice of seeking to grab every federal Medicaid
dollar it can get”).
143. This fact is evidenced by the SMART Act’s moratorium, dictating that Medicaid cannot be expanded for four years. Audio recording: House Floor Debate SB 2840, 97th
Gen. Assembly, May 24, 2012 (on file with author) (House Republican Leader Cross stated
“[the four-year moratorium] is something we do need to do. We needed to discipline ourselves . . . .”).
144. See, e.g., Reich, supra note 58, at 1635.
145. 320 ILL. COMP. STAT. 25/1.5 (Lexis current through P.A. 97-1136 of the 2012
Leg. Sess.).
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jevich,146 the SMART Act dictates that Medicaid now provides no more
than four prescriptions in a thirty-day period without prior approval.147 Before passage of the SMART Act, 143,000 Illinoisans supplemented Medicare benefits and Part D prescription drug coverage with funds from Illinois
Cares Rx.148 Those individuals now pay significantly higher out-of-pocket
costs in addition to their Medicare Part D premium, which was often covered by Medicaid.149
The proponents of the elimination explain that Illinois was the only
state with such a generous program, which was simply unsustainable.150
Advocates for the elderly discount the value of this budgetary decision.151
They argue that “Illinois Cares Rx [was] an economical subsidy for prescription medication for the elderly poor,”152 and it will only cost the state
more by forcing the elderly who once relied on Illinois Cares Rx to choose
between filling their prescriptions and buying groceries and may lead to
more individuals seeking care in emergency rooms or nursing homes.153
During the House floor debate, Representative Mary Flowers argued that
this particular budget cut is both economically inefficient and inherently
wrong, stating: “[c]utting prescription drugs for people who need it the
most should not be an option, should not be how we manage the budget.”154
The lack of notice given to advocates, providers, and enrollees is also a
source of strife.155 However, elderly residents who need help paying for
prescriptions have several options to turn to for help before resorting to the
worst-case scenario.156 The “Extra Help” program helps qualifying individuals pay for prescription drugs, a Medicare Part D plan with a lower premium may be available, and pharmaceutical companies offer discounts for
“needy drug users.”157

146. Telephone Interview with Patricia Bellock, supra note 23.
147. 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5/12(j) (Lexis current through P.A. 97-1136 of the
2012 Leg. Sess.).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Telephone Interview with Patricia Bellock, supra note 23.
151. E.g., Lauzen, supra note 22; Sjostrom, supra note 93.
152. Lauzen, supra note 22.
153. See Sjostrom, supra note 93.
154. Audio recording: House Floor Debate SB 2840, 97th Gen. Assembly, May 24,
2012 (on file with author) (comments by Representative Mary Flowers).
155. See Dean Olsen, New Medicaid Policy Cutting People Off From Vital Drugs,
Advocates
Say,
STATE J.-REG.,
Oct.
29,
2012,
http://www.sj-r.com/topstories/x2053814777/New-Medicaid-policy-cutting-people-off-from-vital-drugs-advocatessay.
156. Sjostrom, supra note 93.
157. Id.
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However, within months of the SMART Act’s enactment and implementation, the Act’s critics’ worst fears came to fruition.158 Although four
medications per month may seem reasonable to the average, healthy individual, about 80,000 people in Illinois take nine or more medications.159
The sheer volume of individuals dependent on more than double the medications allowed under the SMART Act makes more sobering the fact that
“essential medicines are being denied by the state, and patients sometimes
are being asked by pharmacists which four drugs they want to receive and
which they can do without.”160 As a result of being denied previously provided medications, the Community Behavioral Healthcare Association of
Illinois (CBHA) found that consumers “are experiencing increased suicidal
thoughts, higher levels of psychosis, depression and anxiety.”161 Dr. Harald
Lausen of Southern Illinois University School of Medicine predicts that
patients who are denied vital medications will end up in clinics and emergency rooms.162 Further, the CBHA predicts that denial of medication to
patients suffering from mental illness “will very shortly result in increased
admits to the emergency rooms, increased hospitalization, an upswing in
incarceration rates, increased substance abused (and) greater numbers of
homelessness.”163
In response to criticism for cutting the prescription drug program, HFS
director Julie Hamos stated “‘[w]e were required to implement 62 different
changes very quickly’ . . . ‘[w]e didn’t have six months to plan this out.’”164
Despite the fact that Illinois legislators undoubtedly sought to deal responsibly with Illinois’s fiscal crisis while inflicting the least amount of harm to
Illinois residents, they were unable to use collaboration and communication
as the New York MRT did in order to produce superior policy and to instill
understanding in constituents of the tough decisions that are inevitable in
enacting any legislation.165 Perhaps, as Director Hamos argued, their hands
were tied, and they were unable to take the time to incorporate the extensive
communication and collaboration used in New York.166
In contrast to Illinois’s abrupt elimination of its liberal drug program,
New York bundled its pharmacy program into Managed Care in lieu of its
158. See Olsen, supra note 155.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See Olsen, supra note 155.
164. Id.
165. See, e.g., Implementation Spotlights: MRT Reform In Action, MRT NEWS, (N.Y.
State
Dept.
of
Health,
Albany,
N.Y.),
Aug.
2012,
available
at
http://www.health.ny.gov/health_care/medicaid/redesign/docs/2012-08_mrt_news.pdf;
Reich, supra note 58, at 1635.
166. See Olsen, supra note 155.
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previous fee-for-service system.167 New York leaders chose “to steer volume to clinically effective low-cost medications, thus saving New York
State $50 million in SFY 11-12 and $100 million in SFY 13-14.”168 New
York is already experiencing significant savings169 in its pharmaceutical
program through innovative reforms such as increased use of generics, paying lower dispensing fees through the use of Managed Care Organizations,
and reducing fraud and abuse by identifying patients who receive medications from more than one source or claim lost or stolen medications.170
By finding a more efficient way, New York was able to save money
while avoiding the negative consequences of cutting mass amounts of necessary prescriptions provided to residents that are already apparent in Illinois.171 New York Medicaid recipients will continue to receive all necessary medications.172 Most plans under the reformed program provide what
are referred to as “drugs of concern” such as antipsychotics, antiretrovirals,
immunosuppressants, anticonvulsants, and antidepressants.173 The reformed
program also continues to cover prescriptions, over-the-counter medications, general medical supplies, enteral formula, and hearing aid batteries.174
Perhaps the most noteworthy difference between the New York and Illinois
pharmaceutical reforms is the ninety-day transition built into the New York
plan.175 This grace period allowed a one-time temporary fill of previously
authorized drugs in order to soften the blow of the cuts.176 Perhaps the absence of such notice and grace period is to blame for the uproar and health
issues caused by the elimination of Illinois Cares Rx, which abruptly denied
many patients more than four prescriptions.177 The most likely reason for
this difference is the thorough and constant communication relied upon by

167. See Implementation Spotlights: MRT Reform In Action, supra note 165, at 8.
168. Id.
169. Special Needs Consulting Services, Pharmaceutical Care Management Association, Savings Generated by New York’s Medicaid Pharmacy Reform, (Oct. 2012), at 1, 4,
http://www.sncservices.com/NY%20Medicaid%20Pharmacy%20Report%2010-2212%20UPDATED.pdf [hereinafter Special Needs Consulting Services] (estimating a savings
of $425 million, more than four times the estimated $100 million).
170. Id. at 4-5.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Conference Report, Health Planning Council, Medicaid Redesign: The New
Landscape
from
a
Consumer
Perspective
(Feb.
13,
2012),
at
18,
http://www.hsctc.org/uploads/documents/Health%20Info/Feb%2013%20HPC%20presentati
on%20New%20Landscape%20Tompkins.pdf [hereinafter New Landscape].
174. Id.
175. Implementation Spotlights: MRT Reform In Action, supra note 165, at 8.
176. New Landscape, supra note 173, at 19.
177. See Olsen, supra note 155.
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the New York reformers,178 which is conspicuously lacking in the process
implemented by Illinois leaders.179
In this particular area, not only did the New York reformers seek constituent involvement during the planning stages through the MRT process180
but they also made sure that they heard and responded to concerns of stakeholders, including patient advocates who carefully monitored the carve-in
of the new pharmaceutical program.181 Although consumer advocates predicted problems caused by limited access to drugs, Special Needs Consulting Services (SNCS) noted that these fears did not come to fruition.182 After
extensive data collection, SNCS concluded authorization was necessary for
only one percent of drugs, and two-thirds of that one percent were successfully authorized and provided to Medicaid patients.183 Due to direct communication with stakeholders, reformers were able to react in a quick and
focused manner to refine even what would be deemed by most a successful
reform.184 Despite the small number of drugs that were required and did not
receive authorization, the New York Office of Mental Health responded to
complaints from mental health advocates by creating a work group for the
sole purpose of determining the cause and source of barriers to receiving
prescription benefits.185
Further, each MCO prepared and implemented a “comprehensive transition plan to ensure a smooth transition of benefits for enrollees to the
managed care plan” and to “minimize the potential impacts on beneficiaries, providers, and prescribers.”186 Included in each plan was the procedure
for notifying both providers and beneficiaries of upcoming changes. 187 The
MCOs provided notification one month before the changes were implemented and established required call centers with the dual purposes of
reaching out to providers and taking the questions of both providers and
Medicaid recipients.188
178. See Implementation Spotlights: MRT Reform In Action, supra note 165.
179. See Illinois Elder Law Attorneys Negotiate Better DRA Rules, supra note 129;
Audio recording: House Floor Debate SB 2840, 97th Gen. Assembly, May 24, 2012 (on file
with author); Audio recording: House Exec. Comm. SB 2840, 97th Gen. Assembly, May 22,
2012 (on file with author).
180. See generally N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 8.5 Order No. 5 (West,
Westlaw through Dec. 26, 2012); New York Achieves Substantial Savings through Medicaid
Reforms, State Coverage Initiatives, Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (Oct. 2011)
http://www.health.ny.gov/health_care/medicaid/redesign/.
181. See Special Needs Consulting Services, supra note 169, at 7-8.
182. Id. at 8.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Special Needs Consulting Services, supra note 169, at 8.
187. Id. at 7.
188. Id.
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Through its innovative use of collaboration, communication, and the
resulting superior policy, New York leaders were able to ensure that the
state saved money while as few patients as possible had the same experience as fifty-seven-year-old Illinois resident, Ronnie Beck.189 Beck went
without medication to treat her chronic pain for a month before a nurse was
able to obtain state approval for her extra prescription.190 After spending
ninety minutes on the phone, the nurse achieved only partial victory, as the
ten other drugs Beck previously relied on were still denied, and the pain
medication was approved for only two months.191 If New York residents are
faced with such a nightmare, they are assured that they have direct access to
decision makers and that New York’s leaders are receptive to their complaints.192 The same is not apparent in Illinois.193
4.

Ambulance Services

The states’ new policies regarding ambulance services also highlight
the contrast between New York’s innovative approach and Illinois’s generally traditional approach to reform. New York’s innovation in the area of
providing ambulance services further demonstrates the benefits of using
collaboration to discover and implement superior policy decisions.194 In
Illinois, the legislature reduced the rate of reimbursement for ambulance
services.195 Illinois also sought to reduce the use of nonemergency ambulance transportation in two ways. First, legislators changed a previous rule
that required ambulance transportation between hospitals and nursing
homes in order to cut down on unnecessary ambulance use.196 Second, the
reformers enacted more thorough monitoring of nonemergency transportation by requiring a written, signed physician discharge order and a medical
certification.197
While the Illinois reforms wisely seek efficiency and improved oversight, the New York reforms, which are a product of New York’s superior
process of collaborating with interested parties, demonstrate superior poli189. Compare Special Needs Consulting Services, supra note 169, at 1, 4, with Olsen, supra note 155.
190. Olsen, supra note 155.
191. Id.
192. See Special Needs Consulting Services, supra note 169, at 1, 4.
193. Compare Special Needs Consulting Services, supra note 169, at 1, 4, with Olsen, supra note 155.
194. See Proposals Approved by the NYS Medicaid Redesign Team Feb. 24, 2011,
N.Y.
STATE
DEPT.
OF
HEALTH
1
(Feb.
2011),
www.health.ny.gov/health_care/medicaid/redesign/docs/approved_proposals.pdf.
195. See 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.2(h) (State Bar Edition 2012).
196. FY13 Medical Assistance Budget Actions, supra note 26.
197. See 305 ILL. COMP. S TAT 5/5-4.2(g) (State Bar Edition 2012).
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cy.198 In contrast to Illinois’s linear, traditional approach that seeks to limit
use in order to decrease cost,199 New York took a more holistic approach.200
Although New York started with the same changes as Illinois by implementing rate reduction and seeking to eliminate unnecessary nonemergency
ambulance transportation, the MRT did not stop there.201 The Empire State
is already experiencing success after creating “a more seamless, costefficient, and quality-oriented delivery of transportation services to Medicaid enrollees.”202
The New York lawmakers experimented with privatization and regional management in the Hudson Valley203 beginning in July 2011.204
They were able to increase efficiency while decreasing waste and cost by
hiring a private medical transportation company, centralizing the administration of ambulance services, and alleviating the burden on local government of managing nonemergency ambulance services.205 Further, the
state government’s involvement in the provision of ambulance services
resulted in “an efficient regional model of Medicaid transportation management” through resource coordination and more consistent oversight.206
New York Medicaid recipients now enjoy superior nonemergency ambulance services.207 This creative solution to transportation resolves complaints, identifies provider and public transit deficiencies in less time, and
provides more reliable pickup times.208 The most proactive aspect of New
York’s reform, and the most obvious example of the inventiveness that results from collaboration in the political process, is the identification of those
who frequently use ambulance services, the analysis of and communication
with these individuals, and the use of more cost effective transportation
where appropriate.209 This resulted in a significant drop in unnecessary use
198. See, e.g., N.Y. Plan, supra note 43; see Proposals Approved by the NYS Medicaid Redesign Team, supra note 194; Special Needs Consulting Services, supra note 169, at
1, 4.
199. See id.
200. See Proposals Approved by the NYS Medicaid Redesign Team, supra note 194.
201. See Implementation Spotlights: MRT Reform In Action, supra note 165, at 6.
202. See id.
203. Conference Report, Senate Health Committee, Jason Helgerson, Medicaid Director, Medicaid Redesign Team: Progress Update, 17 (Jan. 18, 2012),
http://www.health.ny.gov/health_care/medicaid/redesign/.
204. See Implementation Spotlights: MRT Reform In Action, supra note 165, at 6.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See Conference Report, Senate Health Committee, Jason Helgerson, Medicaid
Director, Medicaid Redesign Team: Progress Update, 17 (Jan. 18, 2012),
http://www.health.ny.gov/health_care/medicaid/redesign/.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 7.
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of costly ambulance rides and a significant drop in cost to the state, as evidenced by the chart below.210
Sentinel Effect: Number of Frequent Emergency Ambulance Users
Drop After Letter is Distributed211

5.

Dental Services

New York’s superior policy is also apparent upon examination of the
treatment of dental services in both New York and Illinois.212 As dental
service is optional, the Illinois reformers chose to eliminate it for adults
except in emergency situations.213 Illinois Medicaid no longer covers preventive services, such as cleanings and fillings.214 New York, on the other
hand, chose to reduce the reimbursement rates paid for dental care to the
rates paid by managed care providers for procedures performed in high
volume.215 The New York reformers were able to find an economically efficient way to provide the same services.216 New York Medicaid enrollees

at 7.

210.

See id.; see Implementation Spotlights: MRT Reform In Action, supra note 165,

211. Id.
212. Compare FY13 Medical Assistance Budget Actions, supra note 26, with Proposals Approved by the NYS Medicaid Redesign Team, supra note 194.
213. FY13 Medical Assistance Budget Actions, supra note 26.
214. Caitlin Padula, Good Health Care Doesn’t Have to Feel like Pulling Teeth,
SHRIVER
BRIEF
(June
25,
2012),
http://
http://www.theshriverbrief.org/2012/06/articles/health-care-justice/good-health-care-doesnthave-to-feel-like-pulling-teeth/.
215. Proposals Approved by the NYS Medicaid Redesign Team, supra note 194 (proposal 17).
216. See id.
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will keep their current benefits, while the state saves money by creating a
more efficient reimbursement system.217
Although eliminating dental will result in significant upfront savings
for Illinois,218 the negative ramifications of this cut may actually end up
costing the state money.219 Preventive services are often able to prevent
minor issues, like cavities, from causing unsalvageable teeth or infections,
which can be dangerous and expensive.220 For example, in 2009, preventable dental conditions caused 830,590 emergency room visits,221 and between 2008 and 2011, Chicago-area hospitals alone recorded 77,000 visits
for dental issues.222 Not only do emergency room and hospital visits cost
ten times more than preventive care from a dentist,223 hospitals are unable
to provide correct dental care, as most doctors are trained only to provide
temporary treatment for pain or infection.224 Beyond the negative effects on
the state’s bottom line, poor oral health from failure to receive preventive
care is connected to low birth weights, coronary heart disease, strokes, and
cancer, all of which require medical care with costs far exceeding that of
preventive adult dental services.225 Therefore, failure of a state to ensure
that dental care is provided to its citizens results in greater costs to the state
and poorer health for its residents.226
Clearly, cutting dental services constitutes poor public policy that may
have been avoided had more voices been heard during the political process
as occurred in New York. The Pew Center on the States cautions against
drastic rate reductions and other cuts that can reduce access to dental care
and advises that states “[m]aintain reasonable Medicaid policies” in order to
maintain both balanced budgets and overall health.227 Although New York
does not engage in the Pew Center’s recommended investment in prevention, its reforms maintain access to dental services and do not discourage
dentists from accepting Medicaid patients, as the new lower rates are al217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id.
FY13 Medical Assistance Budget Actions, supra note 26 (item 6).
Padula, supra note 214.
Id.
Id.
A Costly Dental Destination: Hospital Care Means States Pay Dearly, PEW
CHILDREN’S DENTAL CAMPAIGN ISSUE BRIEF, (Pew Center on the States, Wash. D.C.), 4
(Feb. 2012) available at www.pewcenteronthestates.org/dental.
223. Id. at 3.
224. Id.
225. Padula, supra note 214.
226. Michigan lawmakers quickly understood the folly of cutting such services when
the state experienced a ten percent increase in emergency room visits after reducing adult
dental coverage. A Costly Dental Destination: Hospital Care Means States Pay Dearly,
supra note 222, at 10.
227. Id.
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ready used effectively by managed care providers and only affect widely
used procedures.228
New York’s action was far less drastic than that of Illinois and will
save the state money in the long run without risking the expense of increased emergency room visits.229 Thus, New York, through its collaborative process, implemented a wiser policy than did Illinois.
C.

INNOVATIVE REFORMS IN NEW YORK

The New York global spending cap was briefly discussed above,230 but
here it will be analyzed with greater detail to emphasize the creativity and
innovation produced by the collaborative process. The Budget Department
set a global state Medicaid spending cap for the Department of Health of
$15.3 billion in 2011 and 2012 and of $15.9 billion in 2012 and 2013.231 In
contrast to traditional cuts, specifically those implemented in Illinois, the
New York leaders did not merely make decisions to cut from the top and
wait to learn of their effect.232 The cap changed the way the Departments of
Health and Budget operate.233 It allowed the Departments to make spending
decisions individually and on a more localized level, causing improved
coordination and communication, more disciplined and analytic decisions,
and weekly staff meetings for faster and more effective decisions.234 Transparency with the general public was tied into this aspect of the reform, as
the Departments of Health and Budget closely monitor and report spending
online each month using both analysis of regional spending and a forecast
model of the spending cap as a whole.235 As of September 2012, Medicaid
spending was safely under the spending cap at $49 million below projections, as shown below in the Medicaid Global Spending Cap chart and table.236
228. See Padula, supra note 214.
229. Compare Proposals Approved by the NYS Medicaid Redesign Team, supra note
194 (proposal 17), with FY13 Medical Assistance Budget Actions, supra note 26, and A
Costly Dental Destination: Hospital Care Means States Pay Dearly, supra note 222, at 10.
230. See supra Part V.
231. Conference Report, N.Y. State Dep’t of Health, Medicaid Redesign Team Meeting, 20 (Oct. 5, 2011) http://www. health.ny.gov/health_care/medicaid/redesign/docs/201110-05_mrt_presentation.pdf.
232. Compare id., with Save Medicaid Access and Resources Together Act, Pub. Act
97-0689, 2011 Ill. Adv. Legis. Serv. 689, at *1 (LexisNexis).
233. Conference Report, N.Y. State Dep’t of Health, Medicaid Redesign Team Meeting, 20 (Oct. 5, 2011) http://www. health.ny.gov/health_care/medicaid/redesign/docs/201110-05_mrt_presentation.pdf.
234. Id. at 27-28.
235. Id. at 20, 28.
236. Redesigning the Medicaid Program: Medicaid Global Spending Cap, N.Y.
STATE
DEPT.
OF
HEALTH,
2
(Sept.
2012),
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New York Medicaid Global Spending Cap237
Medicaid Global Spending Cap
2012-13

$18,000
$16,000
$14,000

$15,912
Projected
Actual

$12,000
Millions

$10,000
$8,000
$6,000
$4,000
$2,000
$0

Medicaid Spending
September 2012
(dollars in millions)
Category of Service
Total Fee For Service
Inpatient
Outpatient/Emergency Room
Clinic
Nursing Homes
Other Long Term Care
Non-Institutional
Medicaid Managed Care
Family Health Plus
Medicaid Administration Costs
Medicaid Audits
All Other
Local Funding Offset
TOTAL

Estimated
$5,799
$1,574
$286
$319
$1,711
$944
$966
$4,480
$468
$267
($161)
$467
($3,638)
$7,682

Actual
$5,800
$1,556
$264
$347
$1,691
$946
$997
$4,480
$463
$250
($164)
$443
($3,638)
$7,633

Variance
$0
($18)
($21)
$28
($21)
$2
$31
($0)
($5)
($17)
($3)
($24)
$0
($49)

3|P a g e

http://www.health.ny.gov/health_care/medicaid/regulations/global_cap/monthly/docs/septe
mber_2012_report.pdf.
237. Id. at 3.
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Itemized Summary of New York Medicaid Spending238
Medicaid Spending
September 2012
(dollars in millions)
Category of Service
Total Fee For Service
Inpatient
Outpatient/Emergency Room
Clinic
Nursing Homes
Other Long Term Care
Non-Institutional
Medicaid Managed Care
Family Health Plus
Medicaid Administration Costs
Medicaid Audits
All Other
Local Funding Offset
TOTAL

Estimated
$5,799
$1,574
$286
$319
$1,711
$944
$966
$4,480
$468
$267
($161)
$467
($3,638)
$7,682

Actual
$5,800
$1,556
$264
$347
$1,691
$946
$997
$4,480
$463
$250
($164)
$443
($3,638)
$7,633

Variance
$0
($18)
($21)
$28
($21)
$2
$31
($0)
($5)
($17)
($3)
($24)
$0
($49)

The collaborative process in New York produced a creative way to cut
3|P a g e
spending while avoiding unilateral, top-down decisions with unanticipated,
counterproductive ramifications. New York will largely avoid the unanticipated cost of cuts that Illinois experienced after cutting its prescription drug
program and likely will occur with Illinois’s decision to limit access to dental services.239
Another innovative cost-saving effort undertaken by New York reformers is that of addressing pressure ulcers.240 The Gold Success Through
Assessment, Management, and Prevention (STAMP) program trains
healthcare professionals to recognize and effectively treat, communicate
about, and prevent pressure ulcers and has experienced great success since
its birth in 2008.241 Due to this statewide effort, the occurrence of pressure
ulcers and spending for their treatment decreased significantly since 2010,
as the chart below demonstrates.242

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Id.
See, e.g., Padula, supra note 214; Sjostrom, supra note 93.
See Implementation Spotlights: MRT Reform In Action, supra note 165, at 4.
Id.
Id.
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Average Medicaid Expense for Pressure Ulcers Drops 8.4%243

Prevalence of Pressure Ulcers Drops in Nursing Homes, Inpatient, and
Non-Institutional, Long-Term Care Settings244

The MRT took notice of Gold STAMP’s success and built upon this
effort in implementing Initiative 191 in December 2011 as “a patient safety,
quality improvement project” in order to “improve skin care and communication across the healthcare continuum to reduce the incidence and preva-

243.
244.

Id.
Id.

2013]

STOP, COLLABORATE, AND LISTEN!

663

lence of pressure ulcers.”245 In hopes of expanding the positive results, the
MRT holds monthly meetings in four regional collaborative groups made
up of one nursing home, one hospital, and one home health agency and uses
tools such as training webinars and symposiums.246 By collaborating with
state departments and the healthcare continuum, New York found a method
of saving money by providing better care.
In phase two of the MRT’s strategic plan, work groups were formed to
oversee different aspects of implementing the reform initiatives.247 These
groups provided further opportunity for communication and collaboration
with stakeholders and New York residents in general.248 Each group was
led by an MRT member but was made up of other stakeholders in order to
involve more people, voices, and points of view in the process.249 In order
to communicate with New York residents, each group maintains a website
where the public can listen to meetings on conference calls or review audio
and minutes within days of the meetings.250 The public is also encouraged
to stay educated and involved through the MRT’s website, e-mail listserv,
and Facebook and Twitter accounts.251 Although this communication and
collaboration undoubtedly required more time and detailed planning than
unilateral decisions, it paid off with innovative policy and constituent and
stakeholder approval.252
VIII.

Conclusion

The bloated budgets in both Illinois and New York necessitated a task
so unsavory that no amount of tact or innovation could make it pleasant. In
order to cut their Medicaid expenditures, the states took two approaches
yielding vastly different results. An analysis of the SMART Act demonstrated the adverse effects of a top-down, non-collaborative approach to
legislation.253 In contrast, the New York Model demonstrated that collaboration and communication with constituents and interested parties yields

245.
246.
247.

See Implementation Spotlights: MRT Reform In Action, supra note 165, at 4.
Id.
Conference Report, N.Y. State Dept. of Health, Medicaid Redesign Team Meeting,
(Oct.
5,
2011),
at
50-51,
http://www.
health.ny.gov/health_care/medicaid/redesign/docs/2011-10-05_mrt_presentation.pdf.
248. Id. at 50-57.
249. Id. at 50.
250. Id. at 52.
251. Id. at 59.
252. See, e.g., N.Y. Plan, supra note 43; Governor Accepts Recommendations from
the Medicaid Redesign Team, supra note 107.
253. See, e.g., A Costly Dental Destination: Hospital Care Means States Pay Dearly,
supra note 222, at 4; Sjostrom, supra note 93.
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superior results and softens the blow of decisions that are difficult and often
painful for all involved.254
New York’s reform plan utilized collaboration through Governor
Cuomo’s MRT, which involved interested parties in every step of the process and communicated with constituents on a regular basis.255 Superior
policy resulted from this superior process of open collaboration and communication in the form of innovative approaches to eligibility requirements,
prescriptions, ambulance services, and dental care.256 These innovations
allowed the state to save money while continuing to provide medical services to its constituents and, in some cases, even improving the quality of
those services.257
Specifically, instead of focusing on narrowing the pool of residents eligible for Medicaid, as the SMART Act did,258 the New York plan focused
on providing services more efficiently and expanding both services and
subscribers by seeking increased federal funding.259 While Illinois chose to
eliminate its pharmacy program,260 the New York plan was able to save
while providing medications to residents by using low-cost medications and
generics, utilizing managed care organizations for lower dispensing fees,
and increasing oversight to reduce fraud and abuse.261 New York also gave
a ninety-day transition period to prevent shock from the new system and
established call centers to communicate with enrollees and providers.262
254. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 8.5 (West, Westlaw through
Dec. 26, 2012); MRT Proposals Project Management Plan, supra note 95; Special Needs
Consulting Services, supra note 169, at 1, 4.
255. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 8.5 Order No. 5 (West,
Westlaw through Dec. 26, 2012); N.Y. Plan, supra note 43; See Implementation Spotlights:
MRT Reform In Action, supra note 165, at 8; Conference Report, N.Y. State Dept. of Health,
Medicaid Redesign Team Meeting, (Oct. 5, 2011), 50-51, http://www.
health.ny.gov/health_care/medicaid/redesign/docs/2011-10-05_mrt_presentation.pdf.
256. Compare N.Y. Plan, supra note 43, with 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-1.2, 5/5-4(a),
5/5-2(15), 5/5-5 (Lexis current through P.A. 97-1136 of the 2012 Leg. Sess.) (Ill. increased
eligibility requirements), and 320 ILL. COMP. STAT. 25/1.5 (Lexis current through P.A. 971136 of the 2012 Leg. Sess.) (Ill. eliminated prescription program), and 305 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/5-4.2(h) (Lexis current through P.A. 97-1136 of the 2012 Leg. Sess.) (Ill. ambulance
services changes), and 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5f(b)(v) (Lexis current through P.A. 971136 of the 2012 Leg. Sess.) (Ill. eliminated preventive adult dental services).
257. See, e.g., MRT Proposals Project Management Plan, supra note 95; Special
Needs Consulting Services, supra note 169, at 1, 4-5.
258. 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-1.2, 5/5-4(a), 5/5-2(15), 5/5-5 (State Bar Edition
2012).
259. Sykes, supra note 56. See MRT Proposals Project Management Plan, supra
note 95.
260. 320 ILL. COMP. STAT. 25/1.5 (State Bar Edition 2012).
261. E.g., Special Needs Consulting Services, supra note 169, at 1, 4-5; Implementation Spotlights: MRT Reform In Action, supra note 165, at 8.
262. See Special Needs Consulting Services, supra note 169, at 7-8.
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Although Illinois will save on ambulance services by implementing rate
reductions and eliminating unnecessary, nonemergency ambulance rides,263
New York residents are already benefiting from a more holistic approach.264
The New York plan privatized ambulance services, took the administrative
burden from local governments,265 and increased efficiency by coordinating
nonemergency ambulance services on a regional level.266 Where Illinois
eliminated preventive dental services and risked the increased cost of extra
emergency room visits,267 New York reasonably reduced reimbursement
rates for dental services in order to provide the same services in a more
economically efficient way.268 Even where New York leaders implemented
more severe reimbursement rate reductions than Illinois, the New York
reforms received greater acceptance.269 This can only be explained by New
York’s communication with interested parties who likely felt heard and
included in the decision and did not speak out against it.270
New York’s reform process also yielded several noteworthy innovations that have no counterparts in Illinois’s SMART Act.271 New York put a
global spending cap in place,272 which localized control of spending cuts,
increased coordination and communication, and produced more effective
decisions.273 The New York reformers also addressed the occurrence of
pressure ulcers in order to simultaneously increase quality of care and save
money274 by expanding an existing program designed to train healthcare
263. See 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.2(h) (State Bar Edition 2012).
264. See Special Needs Consulting Services, supra note 169, at 7-8.
265. See id.
266. See Proposals Approved by the NYS Medicaid Redesign Team, supra note 194.
267. FY13 Medical Assistance Budget Actions, supra note 26.
268. See, e.g., Conference Report, Senate Health Committee, Jason Helgerson, Medicaid Director, Medicaid Redesign Team: Progress Update, 17 (Jan. 18, 2012),
http://www.health.ny.gov/health_care/medicaid/redesign/; Proposals Approved by the NYS
Medicaid Redesign Team, supra note 194 (proposal 17).
269. E.g., MRT Proposals Project Management Plan, supra note 95 (noting that the
payment reduction was pursuant to proposal 4651-B); 2% Across the Board Medicaid Payment Reductions, supra note 95 (noting that the payment reduction was enacted in the 201112 state budget in Chapter 59 of the Laws of 2011).
270. See Reich, supra note 58, at 1635.
271. See A Costly Dental Destination: Hospital Care Means States Pay Dearly,
supra note 222, at 3; Conference Report, N.Y. State Dept. of Health, Medicaid Redesign
Team
Meeting,
27
(Oct.
5,
2011),
http://www.
health.ny.gov/health_care/medicaid/redesign/docs/2011-10-05_mrt_presentation.pdf;
see
Implementation Spotlights: MRT Reform In Action, supra note 165, at 4.
272. See A Costly Dental Destination: Hospital Care Means States Pay Dearly,
supra note 222, at 3.
273. Padula, supra note 214.
274. See Conference Report, N.Y. State Dept. of Health, Medicaid Redesign Team
Meeting,
27
(Oct.
5,
2011),
http://www.
health.ny.gov/health_care/medicaid/redesign/docs/2011-10-05_mrt_presentation.pdf.
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professionals.275 Finally, the workgroups used to implement phase two of
the MRT’s strategic plan increased communication with constituents
through websites, Facebook, Twitter, and e-mails and extended collaboration by including more interested parties in their regular group meetings.276
In reforming their Medicaid programs, both the Illinois and New York
leaders set out with the same goal: to find a way to save money in order to
sustain the state financially while minimizing the effect felt by the elderly
and needy. This type of budgetary decision provides ample material for
advocate groups and media seeking to vilify legislators; however, they
might just as easily be characterized as heroes or gallant warriors facing a
herculean task with courage. They seek to mend what many have dubbed a
broken system with both the health of their constituents and the economy of
their states at stake. The SMART Act does not necessarily represent the
work of sadists or opportunists, and it does not necessarily represent a mistake in process and policy. The Illinois legislature was given quite a task
with little time and the threat of a lower bond rating, so the case may be that
the collaboration utilized by New York was not an option. Although no one
may be to blame, the SMART Act clearly demonstrates the problems inherent in legislating with minimal input from and communication to constituents. The juxtaposition of the Illinois and New York approaches dictates
that state leaders would best serve their constituents by utilizing collaboration and constant communication whenever possible.
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